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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

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FROM: CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN

TO : HQ USAF WASH DC

NR : V0017 IN-EVAL 9 Jan 53 (DTG 090003Z)

LIMITED DIST.

PERSONAL FOR

PERSONAL FOR WHITE FROM WEYLAND

Reurad TS 9733 on subj of IL-28 threat. Introduction of IL-28's into Manchuria constitutes definite increase in Communist offensive capabilities and serious offensive threat. I believe the Communists will be capable of atks in 1 or 2 regimental str by mid-Feb. Deterrents to this atk are hesitancy of Communists to risk UN recovery of planes or crew members (Russian or Chinese), and fear of retaliation. As another possible deterrent, I have been studying the prob effects that "Hot Pursuit" would have on the J Ftr Forces the eny maintains on the immed border aflds. I believe "Hot Pursuit", as defined in JCS 1776/240 parle, could cause a redeployment of at least a portion of this force inland and correspondingly reduce the eny's capability to provide MIG esc for IL-28 atks while increasing his opnl problems. Although legalistic dodge of staging through Uiju Fld in North Korea might be used, it is not considered that anticipation of such tac should bar our active planning for retaliation against B's of origin in Manchuria. Although an approach from alt would be detected and result in high eny losses in a daylight atk, eny air atk could be launched at or before first light by a small no of IL-28's to posthole ea F-86 strip, K-13 and K-14. By using a min alt approach from any of several flds in Southern Manchuria and returning at high alt these planes could effect almost complete surprise and possibly immobilize most of the F-86 force. A combined IL-28 and MIG-15 atk folg this initial strike could result in the destruction of the bulk of the asgd F-86's. We depend largely on these F-86's for maintaining air superiority and sptg the opns of our ftr bmrs. In the near future a third B, Osan, will become an F-86 B and will decrease the vulnerability of my F-86 force. I have discussed threat with Barcus, and he is having acft revetments constd at B's

T S : 9824 (9 Jan 53) Page 1 of 2 Pages

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NR : V0017 IN-EVAL fr CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN (cont'd)

farther S in Korea as engrg effort and other manpower become aval. I have laid on recon of certain forward Manchurian Aflds with the ltd equip aval to check, if possible, preps thereon for IL-28 oprs. In deep penetrations however, present equip will permit only scope photo. Should an IL-28 atk be launched I feel we must immed retaliate against the Manchurian B's even though the planes staged through some place such as Uiju. Further, I believe that when this atk is launched it will indicate the eny is prepared to risk the consequences of our retaliation, and that the ensuing air battle may possibly require the employment of atomic wpns. Any actions you can take to speed up delivery of high performance, long range recon capability will be most timely. This equip is essential if we are to obtain first hand info on eny deployment of tgts and remain constantly abreast of curr devs. Would appreciate any views, info or other data which you could furnish me to spt a projected request to CINCFE that he obtain auth for "Hot Pursuit".

NOTE : Advance Copy #2 sent to OOP-CP.

ACTION CHANGED TO OOP (9 Jan 53)
ACTION: ODC ADDED DISTR: OIN, OOP, CCS, CVC, OPD

T S : 9824 (9 Jan 53) Page 2 of 2 Pages ARG/fa

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